Navigating a Delicate Geopolitical Balance
Bangladesh finds itself at a precarious crossroads in the great power rivalry, seemingly without fully realizing the implications. The nation’s top leadership appears to be steering in different directions, risking increased strain on its political and economic stability.
Professor Mohammed Yunus, chief advisor of the interim government, in what seems like a reaction to the Trump administration’s concerns over alleged deep state interference in Bangladesh’s regime change and human rights issues, sought to strengthen ties with China. His decision to cancel the traditional Independence Day parade on March 26 in favor of a visit to Hainan and Beijing signals a shift that may not sit well with all stakeholders.
China’s Growing Influence
Over the years, China has emerged as Bangladesh’s primary arms supplier and has built a massive submarine and naval base near Chittagong—far beyond the needs of Bangladesh’s modest navy. While Yunus engaged in diplomatic talks with Chinese officials, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, head of the Bangladeshi army, was simultaneously hosting the deputy commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and discussing the possibility of replacing Chinese weaponry with American alternatives.
General Zaman has also taken an independent stance, warning politicians against actions that could compromise the country’s sovereignty. Reports, though officially denied, suggest that he has placed certain generals with extremist sympathies under surveillance. If indeed the Biden administration’s deep state played a role in ousting the previous Sheikh Hasina government, it was likely due to Hasina’s increasingly close ties with China—a relationship that Washington found uncomfortable.
Strategic and Economic Considerations
Approximately 72% of Bangladesh’s defense equipment comes from China, including two outdated submarines that were cheaply retrofitted by Beijing. The enormous Chinese-built naval port at Chittagong, capable of housing multiple submarines and warships, has raised concerns about potential dual-use as a Chinese military base. This is particularly alarming for the United States, as it lacks a strategic port between Singapore and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
Despite Yunus’s outreach, China’s official commitments were limited. Signed agreements included an economic and technological cooperation pact and several Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) in literature, media, sports, and health. While Bangladesh made various investment offers, it remains uncertain how seriously China will consider them.
One key offer was the construction of a new Chinese Industrial Economic Zone, despite slow progress on a similar initiative from nine years ago. Another was the Teesta Barrage Project, with Yunus notably encouraging Chinese firms to bid—likely a move to provoke India, given the project’s proximity to the sensitive Siliguri Corridor. Additionally, he proposed allowing Chinese companies investing in Bangladesh access to the northeastern Indian market. However, India’s duty-free import regime for Bangladesh’s goods applies only while it retains its ‘Least Developed Nation’ status, which will soon expire. Furthermore, Indian trade regulations prohibit the re-export of Chinese goods from Bangladesh with minor modifications.
Debt and Economic Risks
Bangladesh also sought China’s involvement in modernizing Mongla Port, originally built to support a National Thermal Power Plant. However, the proposal raises questions, given that China already developed a rival power plant at Pyara with its own port—one that has struggled due to navigational challenges. This situation underscores concerns over Bangladesh’s growing debt burden from Chinese loans, with analysts estimating that $12 billion in Chinese debt is at high risk of becoming unsustainable.
During Yunus’s visit, he also appealed for lower interest rates on these loans. China’s response was lukewarm, offering Bangladesh only a marginally increased financial package—$2.1 billion, compared to the $2 billion promised to Sheikh Hasina before her removal. This nominal adjustment appears to account only for inflation over the past nine months.
The Geopolitical Dilemma
The fundamental issue is not just what China offered but rather the broader direction Bangladesh chooses in global affairs. If Yunus moves too close to Beijing, he risks drawing the ire of Washington and the Bangladesh Army, both of which favor stronger U.S. ties. Conversely, an overt shift toward the U.S. could provoke economic and strategic retaliation from China.
The key question remains: who holds greater influence in the region—the U.S.-India alliance or China? Attempting to navigate between these competing superpowers is a dangerous game. Bangladesh’s leadership must tread carefully, prioritizing national interests over external pressures, to ensure stability and prosperity for its people.
Author: This news is edited by: Abhishek Verma, (Editor, CANON TIMES)
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